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THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE
ENFORCEMENT OF PEACE
Eric Stein*
In June of 1955, I was asked to participate in a conference organ-
ized by The University of Michigan Law School on the subject of "In-
ternational Law and United Nations." At that time I was on the staff
of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs in the
Department of State, and I welcomed the chance to return to Ann
Arbor and to share some of my work experience with the many friends
in the audience.' It was at that occasion that I first met Professor
Bishop. That was the beginning of an abiding friendship which
brought to me so much personal and professional enrichment over a
period of more than thirty years. I recorded some of my feelings of
affection and respect for Bill first on his retirement 2 and again on his
death.3 This essay is a revised version of an address I gave at a sympo-
sium held in the fall of 1986 in Heidelberg, Federal Republic of Ger-
many, in commemoration of the 600th anniversary of the Heidelberg
University. By one of the coincidences that haunt human life, the
United Nations is again my topic.
THE RECONSTITUTION
Even if one does not accept the Hobbes-Bentham-Austin line of
thought that there is no law without centralized enforcement, it is not
just the positivist doctrine that considers the possibility of enforcement
an important characteristic of any law, including international law.
Who today would endorse Gerhard Niemeyer's proposition that inter-
national law must be "law without force"? 4
The international legal order was reconstituted in formal terms at
© 1989 Eric Stein
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1. Stein, Constitutional Developments of United Nations Political Organs, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND THE UNITED NATIONS 347 (University of Michigan Law School, 8th Summer Insti-
tute on International and Comparative Law 1955) (with a foreword by William W. Bishop, Jr.)
(1957).
2. Stein, William W Bishop, Jr., 82 MICH L. REV. 1157 (1984).
3. Stein, Professor William W Bishop, Jr. (1906-1987): A Tribute, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 321
(1988).
4. G. NIEMEYER, LAW WITHOUT FORCE (1941), quoted in Kunz, Sanctions in International
Law, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 324, 327 (1960).
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San Francisco in 1945, as it was previously in modern history in 1648,
1815 and 1919. The ambitious 1945 enterprise of institution building
envisioned international cooperation in all major fields of human
needs and endeavor, but at its core was the centralized system for the
enforcement of peace, if not of international law generally. There is an
obvious direct line from the League of Nations and the Kellogg-Bri-
and Pact to the United Nations, yet I can recall from my personal
experience in Washington, our studied effort to disassociate the United
Nations from the League parentage, to stress the differences and the
more advanced nature of the United Nations: the across-the-board
prohibition of any force or threat of force in Article 2(4) of the Char-
ter and the elaborate instrumentarium for economic, political and -
above all - military collective enforcement measures against aggres-
sion. This mechanism was given a monopoly enforcement power sub-
ject to two exceptions only: first, the unilateral or collective right of
self-defense against armed attack in Article 51, and second, enforce-
ment measures by regional organizations authorized by the Security
Council according to Article 53.
The General Assembly was given a back-up function in the field of
peace maintenance, and its role was strengthened at the 1945 San
Francisco Conference in response to the demands of smaller powers
and the United States.
The political role of the Secretary General, the third principal or-
gan, was expanded as compared with his position in the League.
The shattering World War II experience provided the motivation
and the United States supplied the leadership for the creation of the
United Nations. Yet the new system was inherently fragile, primarily
because it postulated a continuing cooperation of the five major allied
powers.
EARLY SUCCESSES
The Security Council registered some early successes, such as in
helping to induce the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Northern
Iran which they had occupied during World War II, and in advancing
the independence of Indonesia.' Some of us had hoped against hope
that the Council, although admittedly a political body, would deal
with problems of peace if not in a quasi-judicial way, at least with
some degree of impartiality, and through more or less "lawyerly" pro-
5. SCOR Res. 2, 1 U.N. SCOR Res. & Dec. (5th mtg.) at 1, U.N. Doc. S/INF/2/
Rev.l(I)(1946). SCOR Res. 3, 1 U.N. SCOR, Res. & Dec. (30th mtg.) at 2, U.N. Doc. S/INF/
2/Rev.1(I)(1946). SCOR Res. 5, 1 U.N. SCOR Res. & Dec. (40th mtg.), U.N. Doc. S/INF/2/
Rev.l(I)(1946). See generally 1947 U.N.Y.B. 327, U.N. Sales No. 1974.1.18.
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cedures. Efforts were made in the early phase to elaborate procedural
guidelines, to build upon procedural precedents, and to provide agreed
definitions of the many opaque Charter terms. How, for instance,
should one define the term "dispute" in Chapter VI of the Charter so
as to enable the Council to determine the application of the Charter
provision requiring a member of the Council to abstain from voting on
a dispute to which it is a party? The upcoming cold war shifted the
focus in other directions and changed more than the atmosphere in the
Council.
This is not the occasion to attempt a detailed allocation of respon-
sibilities. I should like to add just a few words on the position of the
Soviet Union. At San Francisco the Soviet delegation almost wrecked
the conference by insisting on a veto even on the decision to take up a
problem for discussion in the Security Council. The Soviet Union has
viewed the United Nations as an institutional superstructure con-
trolled by inherently hostile forces. It has been the Soviet policy to
block any move that could in the remotest way interfere with the con-
solidation and expansion of its empire, but to support any action else-
where that would conform to its national and party policy. The most
disheartening feature of the early Soviet behavior in the Council was
its use of the veto not only against proposals which it opposed, but
also against resolutions which in its view "did not go far enough."
'6
Such an attitude obviously made any compromise impossible and any
differences irreconcilable.
At the peak of its power, the United States, confident of the sup-
port by the "mechanical majority," viewed the United Nations as the
epitome of new statecraft and championed a normative approach
based on the Charter. That posture, at that time, generally conformed
to American foreign policy interests. Yet, even at the early stage, the
United States and its allies did not resist the temptation of employing
the Security Council for propaganda purposes of their own.
THE UPS AND DOWNS
The United Nations did provide a forum for negotiations and set-
tlement during the 1948 blockade of Berlin, but that same year the
Security Council failed to act in the face of the takeover of Czechoslo-
vakia. The Security Council debate - and non-action -in the Guate-
malan case concerning the overthrow of the Arbenz regime confirmed
that some members did not accept the Security Council's superiority
6. E.g., The Syrian and Lebanese Question, 1947 U.N.Y.B. 341, U.N. Sales No. 1947.1.18.
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over regional organizations.
7
One of the early casualties of the cold war was the Charter scheme
for armed forces that would be available to the Security Council for
enforcement action in case of an aggression. On the record, the
scheme collapsed because of the differences between the Western allies
and China on one side and the Soviet Union on the other, regarding
the composition of the national contingents that were to be placed
under Security Council control. There is some evidence that the So-
viet refusal to compromise may have been due - at least in part - to
the improvident remark by the United States Representative that the
forces could conceivably be employed also against a permanent mem-
ber of the Council. I personally believe that Marshall Stalin was not
prepared to accept a United Nations security force in any form or
composition whatsoever - not after the outbreak of the Cold War, in
any event.
Be that as it may, the military enforcement provisions in Articles
43-50 have not been applied, but the Security Council did succeed in
adopting economic enforcement measures in two cases: against Rho-
desia in a series of resolutions between 1966 and 1977,8 and against the
Republic of South Africa between 1963 and 1977.9 The voluntary
embargoes recommended against Portugal, South Africa and China
lacked consistent implementation.
THE REFORM DRIVE
The cold war and the deadlock in the Security Council had major
consequences outside and within the United Nations. One was the
7. T. FRANCK, NATION AGAINST NATION, 30-33 (1985) (Berlin); id. at 60 (Czechoslovakia);
id. at 60-62 (Guatemala).
8. See, e.g., SCOR Res. 232, 21 U.N. SCOR Res. & Dec. (1340th mtg.) at 7, U.N. Doc. 3/
INF/21/Rev.1 (1966); SCOR Res. 253, 23 U.N. SCOR Res. & Dec. (1399th mtg.) at 5, U.N.
Doe. S/INF/23/Rev.I (1968); SCOR Res. 277, 25 U.N. SCOR Res. & Dec. (1335th mtg.) at 5,
U.N. Doc. S/INF/25 (1970); SCOR Res. 288, 23 U.N. SCOR Res. & Dec. (1557th ntg.) at 7,
U.N. Do. S/INF/25 (1970); SCOR Res. 314, 27 U.N. SCOR Res. & Dec. (1045th mtg.) at 7,
U.N. Doe. 8/INF/28 (1972); SCOR Res. 318, 27 U.N. SCOR Res. & Dec. (1655th mtg.) at 8,
U.N. Do. S/INF/28 (1972); SCOR Res. 320, 27 U.N. SCOR Res. & Dec. (1666th mtg.) at 9,
U.N. Doe. S/INF/28 (1972); SCOR Res. 333, 28 U.N. SCOR Res. & Dec. (1716th mtg.) at 14,
U.N. Doe. S/INF/29 (1973); SCOR Res. 386, 31 U.N. SCOR Res. & Dec. (1892nd mtg.) at 7,
U.N. Doe. S/INF/32 (1976); SCOR Res. 388, 31 U.N. SCOR Res. & Dec. (1907th mtg.) at 6,
U.N. Doe. S/INF/32 (1976); SCOR Res. 409, 32 U.N. SCOR Res. & Dec. (2011 th mtg.) at 8,
U.N. Doe. S/INF/33 (1977); SCOR Res. 411, 32 U.N. SCOR Res. & Dec. (2019th mtg.) at 9,
U.N. Doc. S/INF/33 (1977).
9. See, e.g., SCOR Res. 181, 18 U.N. SCOR Res. & Dec. (1056th mtg.) at 7, U.N. Doe. S/
INF/18/Rev.1 (1963); SCOR Res. 191, 19 U.N. SCOR Res. & Dec. (1135th mtg.) at 13, U.N.
Doe. S/INF/19/Rev.1 (1964); SCOR Res. 282, 25 U.N. SCOR Res. & Dec. (1549th mtg.) at 12,
U.N. Doe. S/INF/25 (1970); SCOR Res. 418, 32 U.N. SCOR Res. & Dec. (2046th mtg.) at 5,
U.N. Doe. S/INF/33 (1977) (based explicitly on Chapter VII of the Charter).
Michigan Journal of International Law
proliferation of regional security pacts purporting to turn the Charter
right of collective self-defense into treaty obligations. Another result
was a major drive (orchestrated by the United States) to reform the
United Nations without formally amending the Charter.
There were three strands to this drive. First, there was an attempt
to confine the use of the veto to major decisions. The idea was for the
General Assembly to recommend to the Council a list of the non-veto-
able decisions. The Soviet Union rejected the recommendation of the
Assembly.' 0 Second, there was a move to broaden the General As-
sembly functions and powers in the security field, which started in the
case involving the attempted subversion of the Government of Greece
and culminated in the aftermath of the North Korean invasion. Fi-
nally, and somewhat less emphatic, there was the effort to build up the
role of the Secretary General in the political and security field.
In the 1947 Greek case, a Soviet veto blocked Council action in
defense of Greece against infiltration by its hostile neighbors. As a
result the case was transferred to the General Assembly. John Foster
Dulles argued at the time in the Assembly that the principle of "com-
pensation of power" among the United Nations organs must operate
along with the principle of "balance of power" so that if one organ is
incapacitated another must take over. The Greek situation marked in
a sense a milestone also in terms of American policy toward the
United Nations since the United States military aid program to Greece
and Turkey was not channeled through the organization. Yet, the
Congressional act embodying the program contained a symbolic rec-
ognition of the United Nations' authority: according to one provision
proposed by Senator Vandenberg, the President of the United States
was directed to terminate all aid if the General Assembly or the Secur-
ity Council, without regard to any veto, should find that measures
adopted by the United Nations made American aid unnecessary. This
revocable self-limitation which the Congress felt it should impose
upon the United States is interesting testimony to the benevolent Con-
gressional attitude at that time toward the organization.
It is widely believed even today that the Korean case raised an
almost existential question for the United Nations. Had the United
Nations stood by as its own ward, the Republic of Korea, was being
destroyed by an overt large scale invasion, it might have been the end
- then and there - of the organization as a relevant actor in peace
maintenance. There is no question that the normative concern for pre-
10. GA Res. 267(111), 3 U.N. GAOR, pt. 2 (Resolutions), at 7-10, U.N. Doc. A/900 (April
14, 1949).
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serving the viability of the new institution was a major consideration
in President Truman's decision to engage American military power.
The basic Security Council resolution was a recommendation to use
force under Article 39 of Chapter VIII' which meant that the military
response was a United Nations' undertaking; some commentators, on
the other hand, spoke of a collective self-defense action blessed by the
Security Council pursuant to Article 51.12
THE UNITING FOR PEACE RESOLUTION
It is a matter of common experience that chance and coincidence
play an important part in our individual affairs. The Korean case il-
lustrates the play of chance in international affairs. The Security
Council was able to act against the attack from North Korea with the
necessary speed due to three fortuitous circumstances: the voluntary
absence of the Soviet representative, the availability of an impartial on-
site report by a United Nations Commission stationed in South Korea,
and the availability of the American Air Force and troops in Japan.
This experience provided the groundwork for the controversial
Uniting for Peace Resolution of 1950, proposed by the United States
with the somewhat less than enthusiastic support of its major allies.
1 3
Under this resolution, adopted by the General Assembly over Soviet
opposition, if the Security Council fails to act because of a veto, the
General Assembly takes over in an emergency session and it may rec-
ommend, if necessary, a voluntary military action in response to an
aggression. In anticipation of a potential crisis, the Assembly would
send out an observation group to an area of tension, which would as-
sure prompt and impartial reports, and finally, a standing Assembly
committee would develop a plan for organizing military contingents
made available on a voluntary basis by the member states for use by
the Security Council or the Assembly.
Paradoxically, the Uniting for Peace Resolution was first invoked
in 1956 not against the Soviet Union but against France, the United
Kingdom and Israel in order to stop their military action against
11. SCOR Res. 83, 5 U.N. SCOR Res. & Dec. (47th mtg.) at 5, U.N. Doc. S/INF/5/Rev.1
(1950).
12. Vallat, The General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations, 29 BRIT
Y.B. INT'L L. 63, 90 (1952); cf I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE
BY STATES 331 (1963); J. STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 232-35
(1954); D. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 194-95 (1958); H. KELSEN, RE-
CENT TRENDS IN THE UNITED NATIONS 931-38 (1951).
13. GA Res. 377(V), 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20), at 10-12, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (November
3, 1950). See generally Stein & Morrissey, Uniting for Peace Resolution, 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUB. INT'L L. 379-84 (R. Bernhardt, ed. 1983).
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Egypt which they took in response to the seizure of the Suez Canal.1 4
As in the Korean situation, it was the concern for preserving the integ-
rity of the Charter, along with other foreign policy considerations, that
induced the United States to join the Soviet Union in demanding the
withdrawal of the invading forces from Egypt. As I see it, this case
marks the apex of the influence of the normative element in the Amer-
ican policy making process. The withdrawal of the foreign forces from
Egypt in the wake of the deployment of the United Nations peace-
keeping force was hailed as a significant affirmation of the Charter
prohibition against unilateral use of force.
The military intervention in Egypt coincided with the Soviet
armed intervention in Hungary. The General Assembly, meeting in a
parallel emergency session, called for the cessation of the Soviet inter-
vention in Hungary' 5 but, in stark contrast to the Egyptian situation,
there was no response to the Assembly call, only embarrassed silence.
THE CHANGING AMERICAN STANCE
I would suggest, with the benefit of hindsight, that the startling
juxtaposition of the Suez and Hungarian affairs marked the beginning,
of the erosion of American public opinion support for the United Na-
tions. 16 First and foremost among the factors responsible for the ero-
sion of American support and influence was the influx since 1955 of
more than one hundred new members, most of them newly independ-
ent; radically anti-colonial; anti-racist and "anti-imperalist;" con-
cerned with their own agenda; unwilling to take sides on matters
which they felt did not concern them directly; and unwilling or unable
to provide alternative leadership. The other factor of overriding im-
pact was the changing power balance away from United States mo-
nopoly of nuclear weapons and toward bipolarity.
The Cuban quarantine incident in 1962, perhaps the most danger-
ous episode since the end of World War II because of the direct con-
frontation between the two superpowers, took place before the
perceived strategic change and at the high point of American power.
It is interesting that even at that time the United States sought to base
its unilateral action on the authority of a regional organization, the
Organization of American States, and on the fact that the Security
14. SCOR Res. 119, 11 U.N. SCOR Res. & Dec. at 9, U.N. Doc. 3721 (1956); GA Res.
997(ES-I), GAOR, 1 E.S.S., Supp. 1; U.N. Doc. A/Res./390 (November 2, 1956). See generally
1956 U.N.Y.B. 19-39 (1957).
15. SCOR Res. 1004 (ES-II) & SCOR Res. 1005 (ES-II), GAOR, 2 E.S.S., Supp. 1 (1956).
See generally 1956 U.N.Y.B. 67-88 (1957).
16. See generally T. FRANCK, supra note 7, at 67-70.
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Council was seized of the matter, rather than exclusively on the self-
defense Article 51.17 Similarly, the United States avoided relying on
Article 51 in the Dominican imbroglio of 196518 and in the Grenada
invasion of 1984.19 But the crux of the legal brief on Vietnam was
collective self-defense under Article 51 and no effort was made to pro-
vide another rationale.
20
THE REFORM DRIVE: "END RUN" OR DEAD END?
In 1958, Eduardo Jim6nez de Ar6chaga wrote enthusiastically
about the Uniting for Peace Resolution as having "the transcendental
consequence ... to democratize the security and to make disappear
the essential defect, the inherent vice of the structure drafted at San
Francisco . . .the system of impunity."' 21 Although that Resolution
enhanced the General Assembly involvement, by the end of the 1950s
the only aspect of the American reform plan that had proved directly
serviceable was the provision for calling an emergency Assembly ses-
sion in case of a veto in the Security Council. This provision was in-
voked nine times, and it has been accepted apparently even by those
who had originally opposed the entire scheme. Although the con-
tested constitutionality of the Uniting for Peace Resolution, including
the Assembly's power to recommend action, was upheld by the Inter-
national Court of Justice, 22 the authority to mobilize a United Nations
fighting force has never been employed since the Korean war.
Generally, the United Nations' function in peace maintenance has
been reduced to the helpful, but clearly ancillary, peace-keeping ar-
rangements: military personnel made available by selected member
states perform observation, policing and mediation duties in areas of
conflict. The peace-keeping scheme can be traced to the Uniting for
Peace Resolution and to the work of the Collective Measures Commit-
tee established pursuant to that Resolution. Canada and the Scandi-
navian states have actually earmarked units of their armed forces for
peace-keeping operations in response to that Resolution. Even -here,
17. Chayes, The Legal Case for US. Action on Cuba, 47 DEP'T ST. BULL. 763-65 (1962).
18. Protecting U.S. nationals and preserving the capacity to act of the Organization of Amer-
ican States. Meeker, The Dominican Situation in the Perspective of International Law, 1965, 53
DEP'T ST. BULL. 60-65 (1965).
19. Invitation by local authority, regional organization, and protection of U.S. nationals.
Letter from Davis R. Robinson to Edward Gordon (February 10, 1984), reprinted in J. MOORE,
LAW AND THE GRENADA MISSION 125-29 (1984).
20. Meeker, The Legality of the United States Participation in the Defense of Vietnam, 54
DEP'T ST. BULL. 474-89 (1966).
21. E. JIMItNEZ DE ARftCHAGA, DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS
205 (1959) (author's translation).
22. Certain Expenses of the United Nations (1962) I.C.J. 151.
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however, on the insistence of the Soviet Union, the Assembly eventu-
ally has left the job of deciding on peace-keeping operations to the
Security Council.
It seemed for a period of time, culminating during the Congo con-
troversy, that another aspect of the reform plan would be realized,
consisting in the increase of the political role for the Secretary Gen-
eral, particularly in peace-keeping. This move was supported by the
United States as a way of making the organization more effective and
circumventing the Soviet Union; but it triggered Nikita Krushchev's
attack on Dag Hammarskj6ld and his campaign for replacing the Sec-
retary General's position by a "troika. ' 23 The Soviet campaign failed
but it led to the adoption of a troika-like formula for staffing the high-
est positions in the Secretariat. Although many problems dealt with in
the organization have been dropped in the lap of the Secretary Gen-
eral, his position - including his role in the peace-keeping operations
- has remained ambiguous. He is closely controlled by the govern-
ments in matters of any political import and is compelled to act with
great restraint and with anything but independent authority.
THE CHARTER AND UNILATERAL USE OF FORCE
It was United States diplomacy that championed the normative-
institutional approach to peace maintenance, particularly when it
suited the American goals of the day. Without American support
there seemed little strength behind the Charter claim of prohibition of
force. With the "normative retreat" by the United States, due as
much to the changed constituency of the world community as to So-
viet policy and to the emerging limits of American power, the United
Nations' claim to the role of centralized peace enforcement lost any
reality. As a corollary, states have increasingly resorted to military
options as a means of vindicating what they consider their legitimate
interest. Back in 1957, a member of the Institute of International Law
commented on the Charter system that it pretends to forbid the states
any recourse to force, whereas it does not give them any means to
make their rights respected: "Un tel systrme ne peut 8tre viable i la
longue! ' '2
4
The international community is faced with the question whether
the Charter prohibition against unilateral threat or use of force in Ar-
ticle 2(4), which is widely viewed as the most important Charter rule,
23. The plan called for replacing the Secretary General's office with three officials, one from
the West, one from the Socialist East, and one from the Third World.
24. Observations de M. Emile Giraud, 47 ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNA-
TIONAL 267, 277 (1957).
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is still a part of the body of living international law. The Interna-
tional Court of Justice has made it clear that the principle of non-use
of force is not conditioned by provisions relating to collective security
or to Charter enforcement facilities. 25 One might find some reassur-
ance from the fact that in those cases of military action which were
brought to the United Nations, the General Assembly condemned in
more or less specific language what it viewed as violations of Article
2(4). On that score, as Franck has shown, there has been generally
speaking no double standard on the part of the majority - only the
individual members of the shifting majority may be properly accused
of double or triple standards.
26
Henkin finds further consolation in the attempts on the part of
governments to justify their unilateral actions as falling within more or
less imaginary exceptions to Article 2(4) or as self-defense under Arti-
cle 51. This may, he says, amount to "polite confessions. ' ' 27 The con-
troversy over the interpretation and relationship of these two articles
that periodically flares up has not been resolved and the most recent
pronouncement by the International Court of Justice is probably not
the last word on the issue.2 8 There is a danger that the strained inter-
pretations offered by the governments over time could sap any vitality
from the Charter provisions. One cannot overlook the stark discrep-
ancy between the rhetorical assertions of the formal principle and the
actual practice.
Some major conflicts such as Vietnam have never even reached
either of the two principal United Nations organs. The Iraq-Iran war
continued for more than seven years before the Security Council was
allowed to address it. In cases that come before the United Nations,
very often little is done to follow up word with action. As a telling
example, Bowett showed as early as 1972 how little effect the Security
Council resolutions have had on the Arab and Israeli governments af-
ter the early years of United Nations involvement in the Middle East
conflict. In this conflict, the Security Council has repeatedly
threatened sanctions according to Chapter VII, but its threats have
lost all deterrent effect. 29 The frustration caused by the failure to back
25. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United
States), Merits (1986) I.C.J. 89, para. 188 [hereinafter Nicaragua Case, Merits].
26. T. FRANCK, supra note 7, at 226. This "impartiality" may be compared with the double
and triple standards employed at times in the United Nations organs when dealing with charges
of violations of basic human rights and with the Middle East.
27. L. HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 43 (2nd ed. 1979).
28. Nicaragua Case, Merits, supra note 25, at 93 para. 195; id., passim.
29. Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 25 (1972).
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the threats up with action provided - it may be argued - an added
incentive to unilateral use of force.
It would be premature to suggest that the fundamental Charter
principle prohibiting the use of force has become obsolete by inconsis-
tent practice; but the precarious state of a system without a collective
enforcement mechanism is self-evident. Even if the United Nations
International Law Commission should succeed in its efforts to provide
broadly acceptable definitions of all "internationally wrongful acts"
and corresponding legitimate "countermeasures," the lack of effective
enforcement would undercut in some measure the credibility of its
work.30 Standard setting without an assurance of effective supervision
has its risks.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
For more than forty years there has been no war between the prin-
cipal powers, due paradoxically - this seems to be the common wis-
dom - to the deterrence by strategic nuclear weapons, the use of
which is contrary to classic international law because of their indis-
criminate effect. The hope has been that the fear of a nuclear holo-
caust will preserve this situation until a more effective system is
devised. Yet the recourse to force has increased particularly since the
1970s, and the episodes have become more perilous, as seen in the
Iraq-Iran war, the Kampuchea invasion, and the unilateral responses
to terrorism.
Ernst Haas's quantified analysis leads him to the following sum-
mary of the impact of the United Nations in the peace maintenance
field: "The forty year [1945-1984] correlates of success and failure ob-
scure wide fluctuations of impact from era to era. The United Nations
started life with an impressive record of successful interventions. In
the Cold War years that followed, its impact dropped, to be succeeded
by its greatest period of effectiveness. The early 1960s witnessed a de-
cline of over 50 percent in its impact rate, though things grew some-
what better in the late 1960s. In the decade of the 1970s, success
dropped to the lowest levels yet, followed by a still sharper drop after
1980."a3
At stake in the crisis of confidence in the United Nations is "the
30. 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 30-33 (1980); 30(2) U.N. GAOR Supp. (no. 10) 52, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/397.
31. Haas, The Collective Management of International Conflict, 1945-1984, in THE UNITED
NATIONS AND THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY 3, at 19 (United
Nations Institute for Training and Research 1987). See generally UNITED NATIONS IN A DI-
VIDED WORLD - THE UN's ROLES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (A. Roberts & B. Kings-
bury eds.)(1988).
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very habit of international cooperation." According to a senior Cana-
dian diplomat,
[t]he reason for concern now is rather a cynical approach to interna-
tional commitments, wariness of seeking consensus, short-sighted pur-
suit of national advantage, and the distressing inclination of the powers,
large and lesser, to act unilaterally in response to domestic pressures.
International institutions must grow and change and are perpetually in
need of critical examination, but contemporary criticism too often im-
plies that they are dispensable or replaceable.
32
The question is whether the most recent spurt of activity in the
United Nations portends a turn for the better. The cease-fire in the
Gulf war pursuant to a Security Council resolution and the Soviet
withdrawal from Afghanistan were negotiated by the Secretary Gen-
eral. The United Nations plan for a settlement was accepted in the
West Sahara conflict, and there may have been some progress in the
protracted negotiations on independence for Namibia according to a
United Nations scheme. There are some chances for further United
Nations action in the Cyprus controversy and possibly also in
Kampuchea. The exhaustion of the warring parties seeking face-sav-
ing solutions through the United Nations and the improved coopera-
tion among the superpowers may be the principal, reasons for the
renewed activity.
The Soviet Union, apparently intent on reducing the burden of its
international commitments has now discovered the United Nations as
a useful instrument for that purpose and for increasing its world-wide
status. The Third World has moderated somewhat the stridency of its
criticism of the United States in the General Assembly, and the United
Nations has made some progress toward administrative reform and
budgetary control as demanded by the United States and other indus-
trialized states. Ironically, it was the United States that was cast in the
obstructionist role for refusing to pay some $460 million of assessment
owed to the organization. Without such a payment the organization
would not be able to finance the contemplated new peace-keeping ac-
tivities or, for that matter, to continue its on-going operations. It ap-
pears, however, that the Administration has decided to fulfill the
United States commitments over a period of time.
The United Nations, it must be kept in mind, has no autonomous
powers and its peace-keeping mechanism depends on the consensus
among the major powers. In the long run, nothing short of another
reconstitution of the international order will do. The question is
32. See generally J. HOLMES, LOOKING BACKWARDS AND FORWARDS (Academic Council
on the United Nations System, Reports and Papers, 1988-1).
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whether such reconstitution will take place without another still more
catastrophic conflagration or whether it will be achieved through a
gradual evolution. However, experience in modern international or-
ganization has shown that gradualism envisaged by the functionalist
theories will have to be propelled by significant political decisions. To
start with, the United Nations might take a leaf out of the book of the
European integration movement: rather than focusing any reform
proposals on institutional and procedural modifications, it might seek
first a consensus on clearly defined, albeit limited, policy objectives,
the achievement of which would make institutional adjustments indis-
pensable and therefore acceptable. One can only hope, if not expect,
for a gradual mitigation of the effects of the globalization of the na-
tion-state system, for public recognition of common interests among
nations, and - last but not least - for a new breed of statesmanship.
